Articles Posted in Health Law

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has withdrawn its interim final rule requiring arbitrators in the independent dispute resolution (IDR) process under the No Surprises Act (NSA) to select the payment rate closest to the insurers’ median in-network rate (i.e., the Qualified Payment Amount or QPA, discussed further below). HHS’ move represents an official and significant victory for providers.

Under the No Surprises Act (NSA), if a provider and insurance company cannot resolve a disagreement over payment for out-of-network services through negotiation, the parties may proceed to a “baseball-style” arbitration. In this process, a third party chooses one appropriate payment from two suggestions offered by the provider and the insurer, taking into account certain considerations. In a July 2021 interim final rule, promulgated jointly by HHS, the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Treasury Department, the agencies adopted certain elements of the No Surprises Act, including the methodology for establishing the QPA. Essentially, the QPA is the medium rate the insurer would have paid for the service if provided by an in-network provider or facility. Under the September 2021 interim final rule, the agencies established a process in which the arbitrator must select the proposed payment amount closest to the QPA, unless certain conditions are met. In other words, the rule creates a rebuttable presumption that the amount closest to the QPA is the proper amount. Healthcare providers generally viewed this rebuttable presumption unfavorably because it allegedly conflicts with the NSA, which established specific circumstances for consideration in addition to the QPA.

Healthcare providers proceeded to challenge the rule and ultimately on February 23, 2022, a federal judge in Texas agreed with those providers in the case of Texas Medical Association v. US Department of Health and Human Services. The case held that the September 2021 interim final rule does in fact conflict with the plain language of the NSA and that the agencies improperly bypassed notice and comment rulemaking when promulgating the rule. HHS announced withdrawal of the interim final rule in light of the federal court’s decision. While the court held that the NSA requires the arbitrator to consider all of the specified factors when determining the reimbursement rate, without giving weigh to any one factor, HHS has not yet adopted this interpretation. HHS announced that it will be re-issuing guidance, but has not yet provided a specific date.

On July 6, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a 2-1 opinion in Judge Rotenberg Education Center v. FDA that overturned the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) ban on the use of electric shock medical devices for particular purposes because the FDA is prohibited from regulating the practice of medicine. The Judge Rotenberg Education Center (Center) is a facility in Massachusetts that treats patients with severe behavioral conditions and intellectual disabilities. The Center manufactures its own electric stimulation device, known as a graduated electronic decelerator, and is the only facility in the country that uses electric shock therapy to treat individuals who severely self-injure or are aggressive. The Center admits patients that other facilities could not successfully treat, and is seen by some as a last resort for patients and their families.

The FDA first proposed to ban electric stimulation devices used to treat self-injurious or aggressive behaviors in April 2016, and a final rule banning such devices became effective in March 2020. Electrical stimulation devices are legally authorized for use in other medical settings, for example to prevent muscle atrophy and reduce muscle spasms in physical therapy patients. Thus, the key question that the Court addressed was whether the FDA has legal authority to ban an otherwise legal device from a particular use. The Court concluded that the FDA does not have such authority because a “use-specific” ban like the one at issue “interferes with a practitioner’s authority by restricting the available range of devices through regulatory action.” The Court further opined that “the FDA has no authority to choose what medical devices a practitioner should prescribe or administer or for which conditions.”

Section 360f of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act) grants the FDA authority to ban medical devices intended for human use when such devices present “substantial deception or an unreasonable and substantial risk of illness or injury.” Section 396 of the Act prohibits the FDA from regulating the practice of medicine, specifically forbidding the agency from taking actions that “interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.” Since electric shock stimulation devices are legally used in other settings, the FDA’s attempted use-specific ban does not render such devices as not legally marketed. As the Court stated, “any device that the FDA attempts to ban for one but not all uses will, accordingly, still be legally marketed.” Thus, the FDA only has the more comprehensive power to completely ban a medical device, but not the intermediate power to tailor a ban to only certain uses. The opinion underlines the limits of the FDA’s authority to regulate medical devices.

The sale of goods in physicians’ offices can afford patients greater accessibility to healthcare products while simultaneously enhancing quality of care. However, these transactions may pose ethical dilemmas for physicians along with the potential to negatively affect the physician-patient relationship. Physicians should be aware of these potential pitfalls. Specifically, both the sale of health-related and non-health-related goods by physicians may present a financial conflict of interest Such sales may also carry a risk of patient exploitation by placing undue pressure on patients. Local statutes, regulations, and board of medicine rules may further affect the practice.

The American Medical Association, (AMA) has cautioned that, in general, physicians should not sell non-health-related products from their offices. However, the AMA has expressed approval that physicians may sell low-cost non-health-related goods from their offices for the benefit of community organizations, provided that: (1) the goods are low-cost, (2) the physician takes no share in profit from their sale, (3) such sales are not a regular part of the physician’s business, (4) sales are conducted in a dignified manner, and (5) sales are conducted in such a way as to assure that patients are not pressured into making purchases. The most common examples are seasonable fundraisers for community organizations such as the local chapter of the Girl Scouts.

Although the details may vary from state to state, physicians may generally sell health-related goods from their offices. In response to the risk of patient exploitation, the physician may be required to limit sales to products that serve the immediate and pressing needs of their patients. In other words, physicians should only sell health-related products that align with their practice area. For example, it may be appropriate for a patient treated for a broken leg to purchase crutches from that same physician’s office where the patient was treated. Physicians who choose to sell health-related products from their offices should not sell any health-related products whose claim of benefit lacks scientific validity.

The Corporate Practice of Medicine refers to the practice of medicine by a corporate entity, rather than an individual practitioner. That is, the corporate entity employs physicians. Many states prohibit the corporate practice of medicine or otherwise regulate what types of entities may employ physicians. The rationale is often a desire that medical decision-making remain with the physician and should not be influenced by a non-physician employer. These regulations are the reasons that physician “employment” is often organized into physician groups or profession corporations.

Each state treats the corporate practice of medicine differently, but there are three general approaches. First, some states fully prohibit the corporate practice of medicine. These states do not allow physicians to be employed by non-physicians and only allow physicians to form professional corporations, professional associations, or professional limited liability companies (PLLCs) that are owned exclusively by physicians. For example, Michigan generally requires that all shareholders in a professional corporation or PLLC that engages in the practice of medicine must be licensed physicians. Some states may allow other types of licensed health professionals to own a professional entity that employs physicians.

Second, some states have no restrictions on the corporate practice of medicine or otherwise allow physicians to be employed by entities controlled by non-physicians.