Articles Posted in Anti-Kickback

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The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) released Advisory Opinion 23-04 (Advisory Opinion) on July 11, 2023, addressing arrangements between online healthcare directories and certain third-party websites (Directories) with federal healthcare program beneficiaries. In the Advisory Opinion, the OIG declined to impose sanctions on healthcare provider Directories offering these sort of advertising services to providers.

Under the proposed arrangement, healthcare provider Directories are serving as marketplaces in which users and potential patients can book medical appointments with physicians and other healthcare providers (Providers) who are listed on the online Directories. Patients can filter their results by searching for different types of medical providers, and the Directories generate personalized results using a proprietary algorithm.

Although no fee is charged to the patients for using the directory, Providers pay a fee to be included in the directory through an array of payment methods. Whenever potential patients click on a Provider’s profile during their searches, a “per-click” fee is charged to Providers. A “per-booking” fee is also charged to Providers for each new patient the Providers receive through the Directory which may vary in amount based on location, specialty, and other factors impacting the fair market value of the marketing service. Providers can also set spending caps, which would remove the Providers from the directory once a certain amount of booking fees has been met.

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Recently, in Advisory Opinion 22-20, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) approved an acute care hospital’s arrangement in which its employed nurse practitioners (NPs) perform certain services that the patients’ primary care physicians traditionally perform. This opinion may present opportunities for providers because it represents a departure from OIG’s typical approach to arrangements involving remuneration from a hospital to a referring physician and demonstrates OIG’s emphasis on healthcare providers offering quality care to federal healthcare program beneficiaries. However, it must be noted that this opinion’s efficacy is limited only to the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. Other laws, such as the federal physician self-referral law or Stark Law, may pose significant risk factors to similar arrangements. Also, Advisory Opinions are only binding on OIG in regarding the specific arrangements review, but they can be a source of guidance regarding other arrangements.

Under the proposed arrangement, the Requestor is an acute care hospital that provides inpatient and outpatient hospital-based services and which seeks to use its employed NPs to perform various tasks for the patients, who are inpatients or in observation status in two designated medical units and who are admitted by physicians that participate in the Requestor’s program. Participating physicians are predominantly primary care physicians, although the hospital makes the services available for all physicians who regularly admit patients to the designated medical units. The hospital does not take into account a physician’s volume or value of referrals in considering the physician for participation.

The arrangement is limited to two general care units and does not extend to surgical or specialty care units. Under the arrangement, the NPs perform various tasks in communication and collaboration with the physicians that the physicians would normally perform. Such tasks include initiating plans of care, educating patients and families, and arranging for follow-up laboratory or imaging studies, among others. The patients seen by the NPs are under active evaluation and require ongoing medical attention, thus the arrangement allows them to be diagnosed and treated more quickly. The treating physicians remain ultimately responsible for the patients’ care and must still round on their patients daily. The physicians also cannot bill for the NPs’ services. The hospital neither makes payments to the treating physicians under the arrangement nor separately bills any payor for the NPs’ services.

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The Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the United State Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) recently released a template to assist with preparing advisory opinion requests. This template can be used to ensure that requestors include the information required for the advisory opinion process. The template lays out the basic information required for an advisory opinion request and leaves an optional section for legal analysis. Although providing a legal analysis is not required, most requests include significant legal analysis regarding why OIG should approve the arrangement and it is often the most detailed and insightful portion of a successful advisory opinion request.

Advisory opinions issued by HHS OIG are legal opinions that are issued to the requesting parties that apply OIG’s fraud and abuse authorities to the requesting parties’ current or proposed business arrangement. Since the advisory opinion is tailored to and binding on a requesting party’s current or proposed business arrangement, OIG will not advise on any hypothetical or other arrangements that the party does not actually intend to engage in. Although most advisory opinion requests seek guidance regarding the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and its safe harbors, OIG is also authorized to issue advisory opinions on the application of exclusion authorities, civil monetary penalty authorities, and criminal penalties.

OIG also declines to issue opinions on general questions of interpretation, the fair market value of goods, services, or property, or the application of the Stark law or the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act (EKRA). Although advisory opinions can provide valuable guidance, requesting an advisory opinion is a completely voluntary process. Accordingly, failure to seek an advisory opinion regarding a business arrangement cannot be introduced as evidence as proof that the party violated the law.

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The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently issued OIG Advisory Opinion No. 22-14 that applied its November 2020 special fraud alert targeting remuneration associated with speaking arrangements funded by pharmaceutical and medical device companies.

The November 2020 special fraud alert addressed potential Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) risks arising from paying physicians to speak at educational programs and providing benefits to  attendees. OIG outlined several factors that, if present, would increase the risk of an AKS violation.

OIG’s No. 22-14 Advisory Opinion was issued in response to an ophthalmology practice’s proposed continued education program. The practice intended to offer continued education programs to local optometrists, who may be responsible for referring approximately half of the practice’s surgical patients. Although many of the local optometrists refer their patients to the practice, the program would be available to all optometrists in the area, and there would be no obligation to refer patients to the practice after attending the program.

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On July 20, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a special fraud alert targeting remuneration paid to physicians and other practitioners by telemedicine companies. As telemedicine use has increased exponentially over the last two years, so too have the proliferation of telemedicine marketing arrangements and the prosecution of these arrangements by OIG and federal law enforcement. OIG issued the fraud alert in conjunction with the announcement of a new $1.2 billion enforcement action regarding alleged telemedicine fraud.

Generally, the arrangements at issue involve a telemedicine company that may recruit both patients and physicians (or other practitioners). The telemedicine company then pays the physician to review some form of medical record, possibly contact the patient, and order some product or service, generally durable medical equipment (DME) or laboratory testing. OIG has taken the position that the fees paid to physicians and practitioners under these arrangements may constitute unlawful “remuneration” meant to induce or reward referrals under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Pursuant to the AKS, it is unlawful to knowingly and willfully solicit, receive, offer, or pay any remuneration to induce or reward, among other things, referrals for, or orders of, items or services reimbursable by a federal health care program.

OIG drafted the alert as a notice to physicians and other practitioners to be wary of certain characteristics in these arrangements. OIG outlined several ‘suspect characteristics’ that it believes may increase the risk of fraud and abuse in telemedicine arrangements:

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This spring, the Department of Justice (DOJ) intervened in a two-year-old qui tam whistleblower lawsuit against a hospital and oncology practice in Memphis, Tennessee. DOJ accused the hospital of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the False Claims Act (FCA) by paying the oncology practice for its patient referrals. The hospital and the practice have maintained that the complex series of contracts between them represented a lawful business relationship meant to create a new cancer treatment center.

The AKS is a criminal statute that prohibits the knowing and willful payment of “remuneration” to induce or reward patient referrals or the generation of business involving any item or service payable by federal health care programs. Remuneration goes beyond cash payments and includes anything of value. If the AKS applies, conduct may still be lawful if it falls into one of several “safe harbors.” Some of the most common safe harbors are the investment interest safe harbor, specific types of rental agreements for office space or equipment, and contracts for personal services that meet certain criteria. The AKS is often enforced in conjunction with the FCA, which imposes civil liability for knowingly submitting false claims to the government. Importantly, the FCA carries severe consequences, including treble damages and a per-claim penalty that increases each year with inflation ($12,537 per claim for 2022).

In this case, the arrangement between the hospital and practice involved several distinct agreements. First, the hospital purchased many of the assets of the practice, including offices and equipment. Second, the hospital leased approximately 200 physician and non-physician employees from the practice. These first two agreements were supported by fair market value (FMV) opinions. Third, the hospital paid the physicians for management services under a Management Services Agreement (MSA). Lastly, the hospital made a several-million-dollar investment in a for-profit research entity controlled by the practice’s owners.

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Late last year, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a significant Advisory Opinion regarding a proposed joint venture (JV) between a therapy services provider and an owner of various long-term care (LTC) facilities. OIG concluded that it viewed the Proposed Arrangement as presenting a significant risk of fraud and abuse and potentially designed to permit the therapy services provider to pay the LTC owner a share of the profits derived from referrals for therapy services made by the LTC owner’s facilities. The opinion reiterates OIG’s longstanding concern that joint ventures formed between healthcare providers or suppliers and referral sources can present risk under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS).

Under the Proposed Arrangement, a therapy services provider would form a JV with an owner of LTC facilities where the JV would provide therapy services to the LTC facilities. The JV would contract out the bulk of operations (all clinical and non-clinical employees, space, and equipment) to the therapy services provider in exchange for a fair market value fee. The LTC owner would hold a 40% interest in the JV and the therapy services provider would hold the remaining 60% interest. The LTC owner’s investment in the JV would be based, at least in part, on the JV’s expected business from the LTC owner’s facilities. The LTC owner’s facilities were not required to contract with the JV or otherwise make or direct referrals to the JV, although the therapy services provider certified that it expected the LTC owner’s facilities to do so, and during the initial phases of the JV all of the JV’s revenues would be generated by services provided to the LTC owner’s facilities.

OIG concluded that the Proposed Arrangement would not satisfy any AKS safe harbors, including the small entity investment safe harbor, because the Arrangement likely violates the investor test, the revenue test, and the investment offer test. Moreover, OIG referred to its landmark 2003 Special Advisory Bulletin on Contractual Joint Ventures, which includes a detailed list of characteristics that OIG considers suspect when present under a contractual JV. Since the JV described in the Proposed Arrangement included several of these previously outlined suspect characteristics, OIG further determined that the proposed JV presents significant risk of fraud and abuse. This Advisory Opinion serves as a useful reminder of the regulatory framework applicable to joint ventures between healthcare providers and entities in a position to refer or generate business for the joint venture. Providers considering joint ventures should ensure that they are structured to comply with AKS and OIG guidance.

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In a recent advisory opinion, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) opined that employment of an anesthesia provider may be low risk under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) under certain circumstances. This opinion, Advisory Opinion 21-15, may represent a softening of OIG’s position on anesthesia providers.

OIG’s position on anesthesia providers is largely found in a 2012 advisory opinion, Advisory Opinion 12-06, concerning two proposals by an anesthesia provider (Requestor) for structuring its relationship with several ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs). Under the first proposal, the Requestor would remain the ASCs’ sole provider of anesthesia services but would also pay the ASCs a per-patient fee, exclusive of federal healthcare beneficiaries, in exchange for management services (e.g., pre-operative nursing assessments, procuring office space, and transferring billing documentation). OIG rejected this proposal, finding that the carve-out for federal healthcare beneficiaries would not save the per-patient management fee from constituting improper remuneration under AKS. Specifically, by collecting both a management fee from the Requestor and a facility fee from payors, OIG concluded that the ASCs would be receiving double payments for the same services and therefore would be unduly influenced to keep the Requestor as their exclusive provider of anesthesia services to all patients.

Under the second proposal, the ASCs’ physician-owners would form wholly owned subsidiaries for the purpose of providing anesthesia services to ASC patients. The subsidiaries would bill for and furnish all anesthesia-related services (e.g., recruiting personnel and assisting in structuring employment or independent contractor relationships with anesthesia personnel, ordering supplies, quality assurance, and providing logistics). The subsidiaries would pay the Requestor a negotiated rate for its services and retain any profits, presumably for distribution to the non-anesthesiologist physician-owners. OIG rejected this proposal as well, concluding that no AKS safe harbor would protect the distribution of profits from the subsidiaries to their physician-owners because such profits would be a function of the Requestor’s anesthesia services revenue resulting from the physician-owners’ referrals. In particular, OIG found the ASC safe harbor inapplicable because it protects only returns on investments in Medicare-certified ASCs, or entities operated exclusively for the purpose of providing “surgical” services, and anesthesia services are nonsurgical in nature. Additionally, while noting that payments by the subsidiaries to the Requestor, employees, or independent contractors could be protected under the personal services, employee, and/or management contract safe harbors, OIG nevertheless indicated that none of these safe harbors would protect the distributions of profits from the subsidiaries to their physician-owners, since a likely purpose of such distributions would be to generate referrals for anesthesia services.

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The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently announced a plea agreement regarding an alleged $73 million scheme to defraud Medicare that illustrates some of the pitfalls of compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). DOJ alleged that the owners of a clinical laboratory, Panda Conservation Group, LLC, and a telemedicine company, 1523 Holdings LLC, conspired to pay kickbacks in exchange for work arranging telemedicine providers to order genetic testing at Panda’s laboratories. While the parties had an agreement for IT and consultation services, DOJ alleged that this contract was a “sham” to hide the kickback payments and that the telemedicine company abused temporary, pandemic-responsive amendments to telehealth restrictions to refer beneficiaries to the laboratory for expensive and medically unnecessary cancer and cardiovascular genetic testing.

The Anti-Kickback Statute (42 U.S.C. § prohibits a person from knowingly offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving anything of value to induce or reward referrals for services covered by a Federal Healthcare Program. A Federal Healthcare Program is any program that provides health benefits, whether directly or through insurance, which is funded by the United States Government or any State health care program. A violation of the Anti-Kickback statute is a criminal offence and can carry severe penalties, including fines, prison sentences, and potential exclusion from participation in Federal Healthcare Programs in the future.

Since some referrals are necessary to optimize patient care, the Statute provides exceptions called “safe harbors” that permit certain arrangements that follow specific requirements. In the event an arrangement does not meet a safe harbor requirement, the arrangement will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Special care must be taken structure arrangements to comply with the AKS and its safe harbors.

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The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) issued an updated August 2021 Code on Interaction with Health Care Professionals, which takes effect January 1, 2022. Section 7 of the PhRMA Code’s guidance on speaker programs largely echoes a Special Fraud Alert regarding health care speaker programs which was issued by the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) in November 2020. The focus here is on programs where health care professionals (HCPs) participate in company-sponsored speaker programs in order to help educate and inform other health care professionals about the benefits, risks, and appropriate uses of company medicines. Similarly to the Special Fraud Alert, the PhRMA Code raises significant concerns about companies offering or paying remuneration (and HCPs soliciting or receiving remuneration) in connection with speaker programs in violation of health care fraud and abuse laws, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute.

A primary focus of the PhRMA Code’s speaker program guidance involves situations where attendees of such programs are offered meals incident to attendance. In general, the Code explains that incidental meals of modest value may be offered to attendees of company-sponsored speaker programs, subject to some non-exhaustive principles. The purpose of the speaker program should be to present substantive educational information designed to help address a bona fide educational need among attendees, taking into account recent substantive changes in relevant information or the importance of the availability of such educational programming. According to the PhRMA Code, only those with a bona fide educational need for the information should be invited and incidental meals furnished to attendees must be modest as judged by local standards, as well as subordinate in focus to the educational presentation. Companies should not pay for or provide alcohol in connection with the speaker program. Speaker programs should occur in a venue and manner conducive to informational communication, and a company representative should be physically present. Luxury resorts, high-end restaurants, and entertainment, sporting, or other recreational venues or events are cautioned against. Repeat attendance at a speaker program on the same or substantially the same topic is generally not appropriate, unless the attendee has a bona fide educational need to receive the information presented, including attendance by speakers as participants after speaking at such programs. Friends, significant others, family members, and other guests of a speaker or an invited attendee are not appropriate attendees unless such individuals have an independent, bona fide educational need to receive the information presented. To note, the PhRMA Code does not address attendance at a speaker program that does not include an incidental meal to the attendee.

The PhRMA Code also sets out four general principles that apply to companies’ retention of HCPs as speakers at company-sponsored speaker programs. First, HCPs may be engaged by companies as speakers for company-sponsored speaker programs to help educate and inform other HCPs who have an independent, bona fide educational need to receive information about the benefits, risks, and appropriate uses of company medicine and related disease states. Second, company decision regarding the selection or retention of HCPs as speakers should be made based on defined criteria such as general medical expertise, reputation, knowledge, experience regarding a particular therapeutic area, and communication skills. Third, HCPs engaged by the company as speakers should also participate in company-sponsored speaker training programs because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) holds companies accountable for the presentation of their speakers. Finally, any compensation or reimbursement made to HCPs in conjunction with a speaking arrangement (including company-sponsored speaker training) should be reasonable, based on fair market value, and should not take into account the volume or value of past business that may have been, or potential future business that could be, generated for the company by the HCP. The PhRMA Code further cautions companies and speakers to be clear about the distinction between health care professional speaker programs and continued medical education programs. Health care providers should keep these guidelines in mind when designing company-sponsored HCP speaker programs.

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